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achievements was tinged with concern that energies were flagging. Gone was the 
optimism which characterized Haliburton's Account, Abraham Gesner's 
surveys, and Joseph Howe's speeches. While the late nineteenth-century 
histories written in Ontario and Western Canada dwelt on the possibilities of 
new frontiers, the histories of Nova Scotia, although not pessimistic, exhibit a 
growing apprehension that the province was losing momentum. The accuracy 
and objectivity of Nova Scotia's county histories may now be questioned, but 
not the honesty with which they unselfconsciously expressed the mood of a 
generation. 
When Sir A.G. Archibald expressed the wish that the Akins Historical Prize 
essays should "embalm and preserve" the history of Nova Scotia, he meant it as 
an admonition, not a final benediction.19 After almost a century, there are good 
reasons for the modern historian to undertake an exhumation. The republica-
tion programme of which Nova Scotia's county histories are a part should help 
remind us of the considerable body of nineteenth-century non-fiction Canadian 
prose that remains unexamined. The Mika reprints are expensive, but well and 
advantageously produced in facsimile. It is to be hoped that they will make their 
way into many public, and not a few private, libraries. 
M. BROOK TAYLOR 
19 Sir Adams Archibald, "Inaugural Address", Nova Scotia Historical Society, Collections I 
(1878), p. 32. 
Monuments To Empire: Atlantic Forts and Fortifications 
Forts and fortifications are a visible legacy of the economic and strategic 
value Europeans once attached to Atlantic Canada. In securing their footholds 
on the seaboard in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, France and 
England tended to replicate their military experience in Europe. The French, 
although not without a considerable navy, put greater trust in permanent land 
defences as seen first at Placentia in Newfoundland and later more fully at 
Louisbourg. Initially Britain balked at the cost of such construction and 
emphasized its naval power as a more flexible instrument of military strategy. 
Yet in response first to the French, and later to the Americans, the British came 
to fortify their seaboard defences more solidly. The first serious attempt to 
improve the defences of St. John's occurred after Placentia's fortifications had 
been strengthened and Iberville had devastated the English settlement in 1696. 
Halifax was established as a counterpoise to Louisbourg, but its defences 
remained rudimentary constructs of wood and earth until the war with revolu-
tionary France in the 1790s led the local commander to build redoubts and 
towers in masonry. After the War of 1812 Britain met the growing challenge 
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from the United States by new policies that highlighted the importance of 
communications lines and entailed the construction of new fortifications at 
Halifax, Quebec City and Kingston. 
As many maritime military installations are today historic sites invaded each 
year by hordes of tourists, their history is of popular as well as scholarly interest. 
Few professional historians have attempted to bridge the gap between the two as 
Donald Creighton did in his later years when he used Canada's national 
historic parks and sites as the leitmotif for a curious survey of the country's 
history.1 The Fortress of Louis bourg by John Fortier and Owen Fitzgerald 
(Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1979) has neither Creighton's sure grasp 
nor strong narrative. It is a slim but attractive coffee-table book with beautiful 
photographs handsomely printed in Hong Kong, but Fortier's limited introduc-
tion is seriously flawed by such incredulous statements as: "Compared with the 
rest of the New World, Louisbourg was urbane and sophisticated" (p.4). Parks 
Canada chose not to follow this appeal to the tourist market but to produce 
books for the educated and scholarly reader in the two series of publications it 
began early in the 1970s. The series "History and Archaeology" consists of 
research reports while "Canadian Historic Sites Occasional Papers in 
Archaeology and History" is more appealingly printed on expensive paper. Both 
contain a lavish number of illustrations and appendices but unfortunately the 
details on most contemporary maps and plans cannot be discerned by the naked 
eye. In neither series is the standard of editing particularly high, but it is 
markedly lower in "History and Archaeology". 
Two studies of Placentia by Jean-Pierre Proulx, The Military History of 
Placentia: A Study of the French Fortifications and Placentia: 1713-1811 
(History and Archaeology 26, Ottawa, 1979) are very different. In the first 
Proulx places his chronological account of the development of Placentia's 
fortifications within the broader context of that settlement, but seldom does he 
pose larger questions or relate his subject to other areas. The second study is a 
brief general survey of Placentia that clarifies the port's rise under the British as 
Newfoundland's principal military base and fishing settlement that rivalled St. 
John's by the late 1740s, but which declined dramatically after4he Seven Years' 
War. Proulx erroneously downplays both Placentia's importance a s ^ central 
place in the French fishing industry and the necessity of its fortifications.2 
Placentia may not have been any more economically or militarily self-sufficient~ 
than was St. John's or Louisbourg, but it was vital to French communications 
and fishing. Nor were its elemental fortifications merely a hindrance; they were 
essential to the defence of the port from English marauders and naval vessels. 
Naval assaults were repulsed in 1692 and 1693 after the port's defences had been 
1 Donald Creighton, Canada: The Heroic Beginnings (Toronto, 1974). 
2 See C. Grant Head, Eighteenth Century Newfoundland, A Geographer's Perspective (Toronto, 
McClelland and Stewart, 1976), pp. 156-9. 
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improved, and Placentia served as the base for the successful raids across 
country on the more poorly defended port of St. John's in 1696 and 1704. 
Because Proulx fails to place his study within the context of French diplomatic 
and economic history, he makes some incorrect deductions about the place of 
Placentia within the French colonial system. 
Louisbourg was the replacement for Placentia rather than for Acadia. The 
fortress was intended to protect the French fishery and trade, vital imperial 
economic interests as Fred Thorpe demonstrates at the beginning of his mature 
and refined book, Remparts Lointains, La politique française des travaux 
publics à Terre-Neuve et à l'île Royale 1695-1758 (Ottawa, Editions de l'Univer-
sité d'Ottawa, 1980). Thorpe justifiably discusses public construction in 
Newfoundland as well as Cape Breton because both places served to safeguard 
the same economic activities and imperial concerns. This study does not detail 
the construction itself but attempts to answer the questions of why such defences 
were undertaken, the manner in which construction was organized, how much 
was spent and the administrative procedures created to control expenditures, the 
labour force employed, and the nature and source of building materials. 
Although Thorpe ventures into an area never before examined so extensively, he 
writes on the defensive about the French effort at Louisbourg and skirts major 
historiographical questions. When he says that "personne n'a pu démontrer que 
la forteresse de Louisbourg et ses dépendances avaient été construites moins 
économiquement que tous les autres bâtiments publics du continent" (pp. 
49-50), he suggests statements that are never substantiated and comparisons 
that neither he nor anyone else has ever made. As he arrives at the question of 
administrative morality, he avoids the Bosher thesis about the confusion of 
public and personal interests during the Ancien Régime and is content with 
vague conclusions and a detailed discussion of the diligence with which the disor-
ganized accounts of one official were investigated.3 Facing issues squarely 
would have made this work more interesting, just as unblurred plans and 
illustrations would have made it more attractive. 
Of all Atlantic military installations, Louisbourg has of late attracted ilie 
greatest attention. Two works deal with the familiar topic of the successful 
Anglo-American capture of the fortress in 1745. Raymond Baker's A 
Campaign of Amateurs: The Siege of Louisbourg, 1745 ("Occasional Papers" 
18, Ottawa, 1978) adds nothing to George Rawlyk's work of a decade ago, and 
it curiously lacks any reference to that more significant study.4 Julian Gwyn and 
Christopher Moore have carefully edited an integral French source, La chute de 
Louisbourg. Le journal du 1er siège de Louisbourg du 25 mars au 17 juillet 1745 
3 J.F. Bosher, "Government and Private interests in New France", Canadian Public Administra-
tion, 10 (1967), pp. 244-57 and French Finances, 1770-1795, From Business to Bureaucracy 
(Cambridge, 1970). 
4 G.A. Rawlyk, Yankees at Louisbourg (Orono, 1967). 
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par Gilles Lacroix-Girard (Ottawa, Les Editions de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1978). 
Their introduction provides a fresher and better balanced short account of the 
first siege than Baker, but despite the fact that Lacroix-Girard was a militia 
captain during the siege, it fails to clarify the nature of the colony's militia. Nor 
do the editors justify the historical value of this journal except to note that 
Lacroix-Girard was a dispassionate observer. That they themselves make only 
one footnote reference to the journal in their introduction is indicative of how 
little new this source, which fills less than a third of this volume, has to offer. 
Research on Louisbourg has also begun to venture into less traditional areas.. 
Allan Greer employs some of the techniques of social history in his The Soldiers 
of Isle Royale, 1720-1745 ("History and Archaeology" 28, Ottawa, 1979), but 
his work is not so much an integrated social history as it is an attempt to explain 
the 1744 soldiers' mutiny at Louisbourg. Unfortunately there is little here that 
Greer has not previously expressed more cogently.5 Blaine Adams attempts both 
a structural and social approach in his study of the largest building not only in 
Louisbourg but in all colonial America. Although there is some overlapping 
between the two sections of The Construction and Occupation of The Barracks 
of the King's Bastion at Louisbourg ("Occasional Papers" 18, Ottawa, 1978), 
the social history of the building's occupants — from the soldiers and priests to 
the governors — is related in the older manner and with a good eye to revealing 
anecdote. Linda Hoad's Surgeons and Surgery in Ile Royale ("History and 
Archaeology" 6, Ottawa, 1976) is largely a study of the medical and economic 
activities of two of the colony's chief surgeons prefaced by a worthwhile essay on 
the state of surgery and the profession in France of the Ancien Régime. Lacking 
an adequate conceptual or comparative framework, however, Hoad falls flat on 
the question of the social standing of her surgeons in the Louisbourg commun-
ity. In that same volume another study by Olive Patricia Dickason, Louisbourg 
and the Indians: A Study in Imperial Race Relations, 1713-1760, is more 
engagingly written and broader in its sweep. This is really a study of French/ 
Micmac relations and Dickason is particularly successful in achieving a dispas-
sionate analysis of the cultural backgrounds and viewpoints of both sides. She 
concludes that the Micmacs never held the balance of power in the Anglo-
French conflict in the Maritimes during the first half of the eighteenth century, 
but neither were they pawns of the Europeans. Dickason's principal interest is 
the structure of relations between the two peoples; a more encompassing study 
of White/Indian relations at this time can be found in L.F.S. Upton's last book 
prior to his untimely death.6 
While the work of historic archaeologists has added immeasureably to our 
5 Allan Greer, "Mutiny at Louisbourg, December 1744", Histoire Sociale-Social History, 10 
(1977), pp. 305-36. 
6 L.F.S. Upton, Micmacs and Colonists: Indian-White Relations in the Maritimes. I7I3-1867 
(Vancouver. 1979). 
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understanding of the early White/Indian contact period, historians will find the 
work of their colleagues less rewarding for the eighteenth century. The subjects 
are generally too narrow and the methodology too prescriptive in Charles 
Lindsay, Lime Preparation at IHth-Century Louisbourg and Louisbourg 
Guardhouses, and T.M. Hamilton and Bruce W. Fry, A Survey of Louisbourg 
Gunflints ("Occasional Papers" 12, Ottawa, 1972). Lindsay's work on lime 
preparation does, however, illustrate the transmission of European technology 
to North America and tends to reinforce Thorpe's conclusion that public 
construction by France in its North Atlantic colonies was essentially an 
extension of the "French fortress building industry". 
Halifax has not recently been subjected to the same extensive investigation as 
Louisbourg, but two volumes have attempted to illuminate part of its military 
history. John Joseph Greenbough's, The Halifax Citadel, 1825-60, A Narrative 
and Structural History ("Occasional Papers" 17, Ottawa, 1977) goes far to 
dispel the notion, current even among military historians, that the Halifax 
citadel was one of the strongest North American installations of its day. The 
citadel's faults lay in design as well as location. The ridge on which it sat was too 
narrow for a regular fortification and poorly situated for the defence of either 
the harbour or the town. When it was begun in 1825 fortifications theory had not 
made great strides since the days of Vau ban, but by the time of its completion in 
1862 it was rendered obsolete by the range, accuracy and breaching power of the 
new rifled artillery. Indeed, Greenbough can find little solid reason for its 
construction other than it was recommended by the Duke of Wellington and 
served to impress local residents and visiting Americans during a period of 
antagonistic Anglo-American relations. 
In building the Halifax citadel the British encountered the same problems 
experienced by the French a century before: engineers whose vanities 
complicated the project, escalating costs (twice the original estimate), shoddy 
work by private contractors, a climate that did not facilitate construction, and 
the need to import skilled manpower and materials from the mother country. 
Although Greenbough does not draw such comparisons any more than Thorpe 
does, he has unfortunately misunderstood the meaning of "narrative history" 
and turned his account into a rigidly chronological rehashing of correspondence 
exchanged with the Corps of Royal Engineers and the Board of Ordnance. The 
Citadel that Greenbough describes rises on its hill in a vacuum, and we are left 
wondering how this fortification fitted into Halifax's other defences and how it 
was perceived by the local population or the soldiers who lived there. 
Ivan J. Saunders' A History of Martello Towers in the Defence of British 
North America, 1796-1871 ("Occasional Papers" 15, Ottawa, 1976) is much 
better at placing the towers he has studied (not all Martello) within the context 
of the defence systems for Halifax, St. John, Quebec City and Kingston, but an 
infelicitous style and grammatical errors seriously detract from this work. The 
first three towers in British North America, built at Halifax between 1796 and 
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1799, were part of a military craze to respond quickly and cheaply to the threat 
posed to Britain by revolutionary France. In the mother country over one 
hundred towers were constructed as sea batteries for coastal defence, but in the 
colonies Martello towers were more frequently intended as battery keeps and 
land defences. As with the citadel, the value of the towers was as much 
psychological as it was military. Yet Saunders is perhaps too cynical about 
their defensive capabilities. He judges the towers on the degree to which they 
varied from the English usage, and while it is true that those intended as 
batteries could not withstand a concerted landbased artillery barrage, that was 
not their purpose. Except for the one at St. John, the colonial Martello towers 
were integral parts of larger defence systems, and Saunders too readily forgets 
that in defensive warfare delay is everything. As no British or colonial tower was 
ever attacked, their military value will remain problematical. Robbed of any 
dramatic encounters to recount, Saunders' book resembles historic archaeology 
with its emphasis on descriptions of proportions and materials. And if words are 
insufficient there are also illustrations, thirteen alone pertaining to Fort Fred-
erick in Kingston. 
What these studies point to is the similarity of French and British experience 
in Atlantic Canada. Command of the sea was always too elusive to suffice for 
the protection of coastal settlements and imperial interests. By the late seven-
teenth century French strategic thinking had come to link the defence of its 
maritime colonies with its interior possessions. France then began to fortify 
Placentia more solidly and later built Louisbourg. Early in the nineteenth 
century a similar logic entered British military planning and Britain began 
construction of fortifications whose scale approached that of the French. For 
both countries the high costs and the problems encountered in building these 
monuments to empire were the same. All the defence systems contained flaws, 
but fortifications have never been impregnable, or at least not for very long. In 
conjunction with seapower, these installations did serve their purposes of deter-
rent, delay and protection. If historical interpretation has tended to be more 
favourable to British military conduct, it is perhaps because the experience of 
Placentia and St. John's is too readily forgotten while Louisbourg was not 
afforded the good fortune bestowed on Halifax of not being attacked. 
TERRY CROWLEY 
